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Risk Representations and Confrontational Actions in the Arctic
Abstract
The Arctic is undergoing rapid changes and gaining geopolitical attention. The effects of
climate change in the region lead to both potential and hopes for new resources, new or
shorter transit routes, and other opportunities. Most Arctic coastal states have come
forward with interest articulations. Some coastal states also see their national security and
sovereignty at risk. While the region has seen a significant level of cooperation in some
areas in the past, current developments seem to motivate both stronger risk
representations and confrontational actions. Among the coastal states, particularly Canada,
the United States, and Russia express increasing points of contention and articulate risk
representations, and they have engaged in military and hard-security activities that make
actual conflict more likely. With existing conflicts of interests, a high uncertainty regarding
future developments, and even non-Arctic states like China claiming Arctic interests,
conflict potential may be on the rise. The article hones in on current developments
regarding hard security in the Arctic. The empirical section discusses risk representation,
including the role of spatial constructions and national identity, and the confrontational
actions already taken. It concludes with implications regarding conflict potential in the
Arctic.
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Introduction
The Arctic is undergoing rapid changes that generate increased
geopolitical attention and foster conflict potential. With climate change
severely affecting the region, new opportunities to exploit resources
and to exert geopolitical influence will result in the coming years. As
global warming lets the Arctic ice cover melt, new resources such as
offshore oil and gas but also new or shorter transport routes become
accessible. Although it is still uncertain when, and if, suspected
resources are actually exploitable, as most of them likely are within
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), a number of states have come
forward with their interests and claims. Some Arctic coastal states see
their national security and sovereignty at risk, and they have taken
action to bolster security. The Arctic faces growing conflict potential in
the realm of security.
While the region has seen a significant level of cooperation in some
areas in the past, current developments seem to motivate both stronger
risk representations and confrontational actions. Among the coastal
states, particularly Canada, the United States, and Russia are
increasingly expressing points of contention and articulating risk
representations. At the same time, they are engaging in military and
hard-security activities that raise the potential for actual conflict.
Activities include an increase in militarization in the region, new
surveillance capacities and military bases, aggressive behavior among
some coastal states, and increasing articulations regarding the
preparedness to defend interests also by force. The UN-Convention of
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives the Arctic coastal states, which are
Canada, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, and the U.S.,
sovereign rights. Yet, also China as non-Arctic state is by now highly
active in the region. China defines itself as near-Arctic state,
increasingly claims Arctic interests and backs these up with actions. It
may aim to circumvent the Arctic legal order. Intensifying risk
representations and increasing confrontational actions make conflict
potential in the Arctic more likely.
The article delves into risk representations and confrontational actions
in the Arctic to assess how these foster conflict potential. To follow the
article’s proceeding, a brief outline on the research design and on terms
is in order: The article refers to the Arctic coastal states of Canada,
Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States. The terms of Arctic
Eight or Arctic states include the coastal states, plus Finland, Iceland
and Sweden – these eight have territories above the Arctic Circle and
are members of the Arctic Council (AC). The article focuses on Canada,
the United States, and Russia, as these coastal states are the most
dominant regarding risk representations and confrontational actions.
In a separate section, the article deals with China. As non-Arctic state,
it has no legal status in the Arctic, which warrants a discussion apart
from coastal states. China is of interest though, as it is asserting Arctic
interests and taking notable actions. The article focuses on the hard13
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security dimension at the state level with a view to regional stability
and conflict potential. With a focus on security, it stays away from a
thorough discussion of environmental politics. The applied term of
conflict potential refers not to outright war, as that is unlikely, but to an
increasing contestation and tension that may come to involve military
means.
The Arctic is also a maritime space. Due to this, and because of the
space-identity nexus, the analysis considers constructions of space and
identity in discourse on the Arctic. To assess risk representations, and
confrontational actions taken, the analysis has analyzed discourse and
action at the state level. As argued by scholars, it is national decision
makers who are in a privileged speaker position to create geopolitical
images and visions that form the basis for action. Texts such as policy
and strategy documents inform on how national decision makers view
and represent their state, risks, interests, and policy needs.1 The article
works with small case studies to illustrate the discourse and action at
the state level that is of interest here. Scholars see case studies valuable
for gaining a detailed understanding of an issue and of complex
relations in a qualitative approach. The unit of analysis can also be
nations.2 The analysis focused on texts that center on the Arctic,
including security and Arctic strategies and executive statements.
Thematically relevant and current assessments by scholars and think
tanks complement these. Risk representations are part of discourse,
also at the state level, and they become active and material by forming a
strong basis of action; as such, they can shape conflict potential.3 The
article argues that strong risk representations foster conflict potential
and make actual conflict more likely. Existing conflicts of interests and
confrontational actions are also the result of risk representations and in
turn strengthen these.
The article proceeds with a conceptual section on the significance of
risk representations and constructions of space and identity. The
empirical section on the dynamics of conflict in the Arctic begins with
recent developments in the Arctic. It discusses risk representations of
the three coastal states Canada, the United States, and Russia, then the
confrontational actions of these states, and the impact of China. The
final section offers implications regarding the rising conflict potential
in the region.

Risk Representations and the Role of Space and Identity
Risk representations form a basis of tension and conflict. References to
and constructions of space and identity are a frequent element in risk
representations. The term of risk representations refers to how another
actor is represented as risk to the self, and how in international
relations another state is represented as risk to the own state or to the
world. Risk representations are part of human discourse and thus part
of discourse by national decision makers vis-à-vis their state and other
states in international relations.4 This article follows the premise that
discourse has constitutive effects, meaning that representations in
14
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discourse – of self and other and with various qualitative descriptions
and ascriptions – shapes meaning-making processes, interpretation,
action potential, and policy formulation. Analyzing discourse enables
an understanding of how we socially produce and naturalize contingent
meaning, and how speakers offer specific meaning, explain, and
justify.5 Not only humans, but also states define their relations with
each other by identifying with and differentiating from multiple others.
The differentiation from others can form the basis for tension and
conflict, in particular when differentiation occurs in a way where
hierarchy and dichotomies come to define relations. Thus, when other
states are represented as risk or threat, and the own state as superior,
tension is promoted. Exploring risk representations enables insights on
factors promoting tension, including how (national) identity is defined
vis-à-vis friends and foes, how references to space and spatial ordering
are institutionalized into action, and how insecurity and conflict are
created.6 The approach here agrees with scholars who argue that it is
not a matter of causal mechanism, but rather of a discursive force or
“discursive agency” that influences perception, interpretation, and
policy.7 The key interest here lies on how certain meanings and actions,
from among other possibilities, become thinkable, resonant, and
dominant in policy formulation.8 Regarding policy towards other states
then, it is a matter of how risk representations create certain policy
orientations, and how these can foster conflict potential.
Both space and national identity have a political and security
dimension. The reference to space here means how a state relates to its
territory and its considered sphere of influence, in discourse, policy,
and action. Considering how space is viewed and politically framed can
enable a better understanding of how political actors approach regions
such as the Arctic. Space is politically produced and applied to
represent the self and promote national interests vis-à-vis other states;
it thereby becomes meaningful and material, and informs policy
formulation and action.9 An illustrative example of strong spatial
constructions is U.S. discourse: it exhibits strong self-other
differentiation, a sphere-of-influence approach, and action well beyond
U.S. territorial borders that connect with spatial ordering and strong
power assertion. U.S. national identity, with American exceptionalism,
a global leadership claim, and a sense of invincibility, underlies
discourse.10 Furthermore, the manner of representation of spatial
constructions, such as boundaries and delimitations, informs about the
perception and use of spheres of influence. Considering these
representations can generate insights on the potential for ‘collisions’ of
such spheres. Efforts taken to increase own space serve as a political
tool for national interest promotion.11 Such efforts aim at power
assertion and spatial ordering for own benefits. When actors link these
to hierarchical and antagonistic representation towards other states,
they may facilitate tension and conflict.12
Relevant to the Arctic are also identity constructions, as they illustrate
how a state defines itself vis-à-vis other states in the Arctic. Spatial
constructions and spheres of influence are part of national identity.
15
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When speaking about states here, the article refers to the national
decision makers who are socialized in the context of national identity,
who represent their state vis-à-vis other states, and whose actions form
from the perspective of national identity. Scholars see national identity
a key factor for policy formulation towards other states, and thus as
influence on interstate relations. Political actors communicate their
state’s place in the world, along with friends and foes, risks and
threats.13 When decision makers represent another state as risk or
threat to the own state, it constitutively affects relations. Since identity
forms in differentiation from others, national identity comes with the
creation of difference and dichotomies.14 Difference and dichotomies,
and their political use, affect interstate relations and promote tension.
In the context of interstate tension, also confrontational actions by
states are relevant. Even a security dilemma might develop – a spiral of
escalatory steps taken by states based on perceptions and
interpretations of other states’ intentions and capabilities. In a revised
reading of the security dilemma, scholars speak of a two-level strategic
dilemma in a context of ever-present uncertainty that also involves the
dilemma of arriving at the most fitting response.15 Some coastal states
may indeed find themselves in a security dilemma context, insofar as
perceptions and interpretations of developing risks to own interests,
security, and sovereignty grow stronger. They then become part of risk
representations and shape actions more confrontational. The study of
risk representations in a geopolitical context, also attending to space
and identity factors, is valuable in uncovering discursive processes of
constructing friends and foes, and of creating insecurity and conflict.16
Insights into such processes and their motivations can be helpful in
pointing to ways of alternative, less divisive discourses in order to
prevent or reduce conflict.

Dynamics of Conflict in the Arctic
Before delving into risk representations and confrontational actions in
detail, this section presents a background on recent Arctic
developments. There is certainly cooperation in a number of policy
areas, and the solving of minor territorial disputes.17 Yet, there are also
increasing tension and conflicts of interests. Scholars point to growing
geopolitical power games, the expansion of national territorial and
energy policies of several coastal states, rising conflicts of interests, and
the planned development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) with
inherent destabilization potential. They also see more chances for
military incidents occurring, and a new level of militarization and
aggression.18 Even external events can affect regional security. The
Ukraine crisis, with Russia annexing Crimea, has not only deteriorated
relations in the AC with Russia. It has also weakened cooperation in the
AC, and resulted in a slowing and/or pausing of plans regarding the
Northern Chiefs of Defense Forum and the Arctic Security Forces
Roundtable.19 Furthermore, the Arctic region’s export orientation for
oil and gas presents a potential risk, because the involved
dependencies, market dynamics, and energy security issues can
facilitate geopolitical tension.20 However, a simple rush for resources
16
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may not take place, as coastal states differ in their Arctic resource
interests.21 Scholars have also considered various visions of and for the
Arctic, pointing both to multiple understandings of the region and a
more global context. They speak of a history of and continuing
potential for cooperation, but also of developments that can spoil
cooperation, including tension in US-Russian relations or the uncertain
future role of Asian and other states with Arctic interests.22 Others
highlight the complexity facing the region, including the multiple
changes from a warming climate, effects on territorial rights,
sovereignty and maritime borders, and the future handling of sea
routes. The generation of interests, and the actions by non-polar states
to benefit from Arctic resources also pose challenges.23 Some also point
to Antarctic cooperation as offering lessons for the Arctic.24 However,
the two regions differ greatly, as the Antarctic Treaty has put aside
territorial claims. All these challenges and questions, and others, may
offset stability in the region. The article explores some of these
developments.
Most states in the Arctic, and some beyond, have recently increased
their focus and activities in/towards the region, illustrated by national
security strategies, revised Arctic strategies, grown policy commitment
to the Arctic, and troop and military equipment deployments. Human
activity will generally grow too. With states bolstering security and
defense capacities, actual conflict becomes more likely. Climate change
effects, states’ resource interests, and security concerns may result in
incentives for claiming and acquiring territory and resources in
attempts to secure both interests and influence.25 While perceptions of
security in the Arctic are no longer only of military nature, the presence
of hard security issues continues to shape the region.26 Despite the
achieved level of cooperation, traditional security concerns, as in hard
security and geopolitical terms, do remain and may even rise. Some
explore the above-mentioned possibility of a security dilemma
developing in the Arctic.27 Even though the region has exhibited a
rather low level of tension up until now, state actions seem to have
created at least the beginnings of a security dilemma.28 Such a logic
likely strengthens risk representations and motivates further actions
perceived by others as confrontational.
A further problem in this picture is that the regional cooperative
structures and governance mechanisms regarding security and conflict
resolution are underdeveloped. Some argue that the polar governance
regimes have proven quite resilient.29 Others, however, point to clear
deficits, especially when it comes to security aspects. For example,
UNCLOS has shown weaknesses in dealing with security questions that
spill over into Arctic cooperation, such as the Ukraine Crisis; there was
no mechanism for it. UNCLOS also does not provide extensive
governance. Regarding (new) territorial claims, it can only examine
such claims, but not decide them or implement decisions. The AC, as
regional intergovernmental forum of exchange and coordination, has
no decision-making power, and its mandate excludes security. Yet,
military strategies shape the Arctic’s geostrategic environment.30
17
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Furthermore, there are attempts of geopolitical ordering in the Arctic,
including via threat images of other states.31 The growing presence of
military aspects, security challenges, and geopolitical ordering – in the
context of significant transformations – may unsettle Arctic stability. In
the last years, the Arctic states have opposed attempts by other states to
internationalize the Arctic, promoting instead regionalization where
they themselves can foremost shape developments.32 Such moves show
a continued and even rising importance of national approaches and
national interests in the region, which can endanger stability and
security.
Risk Representations
While there is the legal construction of Arctic space, risk
representations can potentially undermine it, and facilitate tension. In
light of some Arctic coastal states increasingly acting to safeguard their
sphere of influence, risk representations about feared rivals are highly
problematic. This section outlines how the coastal states of Canada, the
United States, and Russia engage in risk representations. For all three,
the Arctic figures as significant space in terms of national interest
promotion. They are the coastal states most active in discourse and
actions vis-à-vis the Arctic and partly each other. Canada and the
United States particularly highlight their concern for security, defense,
and territorial sovereignty. Seeing the Arctic as crucial to their security,
they claim full freedom of access and of navigation. Both have
increased their activities in the region, including patrol and
surveillance.33 In addition, both tie their national identity more closely
to the Arctic, as the following parts illustrate. As for Russia, the country
has key interests in a Russian sphere of influence and resources.
Warnings against other states expanding influence at Russia’s expense
have grown.
Canada
Risk representations in Canada reflect “a heightened urgency” in the
Arctic, because access to new resources and new shipping lanes will
likely intensify conflicting interests and result in sovereignty fears and
security challenges.34 Canada is expressing a strong concern over
Russia advancing further into the Arctic and attempting to chip away at
the Canadian sphere of influence, raising concerns over sovereignty
and territory. In the Ukraine crisis, Canada reacted especially strong
against Russia, among others by boycotting Russian-chaired AC
meetings.35 Canada sees further risks in Russian plans of sole NSR
control. Implementation of this could exacerbate the already existing
controversy on the Northwest Passage being international or internal
Canadian waters. Canada has defined the Northwest Passage as
internal waters and considers any unauthorized passage by other states
as violation of sovereignty.36 Some see no immediate peril to the
Canadian position as of now, as there will be no reliable sea route in the
Canadian Arctic for the coming years, and as Russia’s refuting of the
Canadian position would weaken its own position on the NSR.37
18
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Nevertheless, the future status of the Northwest Passage remains
unclear, motivating uncertainty and fears regarding territory and
sovereignty. The example of the passages pinpoints risk
representations and the strong concerns over spheres of influence
between Canada and Russia in particular, which still await a solution.
Canadian discourse understands and constitutes the Arctic region as a
highly significant space for Canada. The Arctic is Canada’s northern
frontier, and tightly linked to Canadian sovereignty, security, and
defense. Aside from the issue of passages, also the claims of Arctic
coastal states on the (boundaries of) extended continental shelf lines
carry conflict potential, as do the hopes regarding new resources. Some
see sufficient vulnerability to “unauthorized and undetected activities”
by other states, which would risk Canadian Arctic sovereignty. The
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has the
mandate to control also the Arctic space and to warn and respond to
military threats there. Canada’s indefinite extension of NORAD’s
command agreement, in cooperation with the United States, illustrates
the significance of the Arctic as Canada’s northern frontier, the strong
spatial element, and the strategic interest. Another indication of the
importance of the Arctic space to Canada is that Canada has made it
mandatory for foreign ships to register with the Canadian Coast Guard
agency that is tracking ships. Canada has even increased its jurisdiction
regarding environmental agreements on water pollution in its waters.38
The latter two measures highlight intensified Canadian concern over
incursions into its maritime space and considered sphere of influence,
and the goal of strengthening Canadian control over it. Furthermore,
Canada initiated a scientific survey to prepare a submission for the
continental shelf coverage in the Arctic, in order to get all of its
continental shelf recognized, as stated by former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Nicholson.39 This action illustrates the strong spatial
construction of the Arctic as sphere of influence, which Canada must
then protect.
The Arctic also figures strong in Canada’s national identity. The Arctic
identity element has its basis in geography and the country’s historic
ties to the region, but also in security concerns – as the rough Arctic
was always a natural barrier.40 “The North is central to Canadian
national identity” and closely tied to Canada’s heritage and destiny,
according to the 2009 Northern Strategy.41 The rugged and cold
northern terrain, linked with freedom and opportunity, frames
Canada’s national identity. Therefore, some argue that regional control
and influence are paramount for Canadian identity.42 Seeing
themselves as “northern nation,” the Arctic is “an expression of our
deepest aspirations: our sense of exploration, the beauty, and the
bounty of our land, and our limitless potential.”43 Recently, decision
makers restated the commitment to the Arctic as part of national
identity.44 The orientation towards the protection of national interests
in Canadian representations of the Arctic has grown.45 Canadian
discourse illustrates the significance of space and identity as part of risk
representations in the Arctic.
19
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United States
Risk representations in the U.S. focus on the Arctic as the “new
geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape” that will affect American
security; there is great uncertainty as to whether there will be
cooperation or great-power competition.46 U.S. decision makers see the
Arctic linked with multiple states’ geopolitical calculations, which foster
regional competition, dissent, and militarization, and directly affect
U.S. national security.47 A key motivator for this view is climate change.
In United States discourse, climate change is transforming the region’s
“harsh” environment and polar ice and thereby directly weakening the
“physical barrier” to the U.S. homeland and risking security. The
growing access to the Arctic and increasing human activity present a
further great concern.48 Discourse expresses fears regarding territory,
sovereignty, and security. Growing economic and political activity of
other states likely will foster contestation. For example, growing
maritime traffic could make the Bering Strait into a “strategic
chokepoint” – causing the United States to monitor the region more
closely.49 Further concerns relate to a thawing permafrost that results
in softened, boggy ground jeopardizing roads, pipelines, and
infrastructures.50 Risk representations express strong concerns that
climate change results in eased access to U.S. territory and sphere of
influence, and multiple issues of contestation. There is furthermore the
spatial construction of the Arctic as zone of protection of U.S. territory
and security – and the growing fears that eased access to the Arctic will
endanger national security. In this context, the special relationship and
the cooperation with Canada on Arctic leadership are important for
U.S. security.51 U.S. risk representations then express a clear link
between climate change and security in a frame of national security and
territorial defense.
The Arctic has gained strategic importance for the United States in the
last years, expressed in a grown focus on the region in discourse and
policy. There is a recognition of the acute changes in the Arctic and
their impact on the country. Risk representations have a sense of
urgency. They portray the region “at a strategic inflection point” – and
seeing both coastal states and non-Arctic states positioning themselves
to seize new opportunities, the United States calls for cooperation that
benefits U.S. interests and security.52 New opportunities and interests
also relate to resources. Documents express the readiness to protect
U.S. national interests and the homeland from risks in the Arctic, in
cooperation when possible but unilaterally when necessary – via
ensuring an unhindered ability of U.S. manoeuver in the seas and
surrounding airspace.53 While the United States Coast Guard is
currently not well equipped to protect U.S. Arctic interests, discourse
highlights its important role. To safeguard U.S. sovereign rights in the
Arctic, “the Coast Guard will exercise and assert U.S. sovereignty where
necessary, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, security of
U.S. Arctic waters, and integrity of sovereign borders.”54 The Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard work to keep “adversaries from
20
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leveraging the world’s oceans against us,” and maintain unrestricted
U.S. access to Arctic waters.55 These statements illustrate
representations of U.S. influence at risk, and a spatial framing of the
Arctic as sphere of influence and room for unhindered action for
national interests and security. The importance of the Arctic’s spatial
dimension is also visible in efforts to expand the continental shelf. To
access the continental shelf off Alaska, projected to extend for more
than 600 nautical miles, the United States plans to ratify UNCLOS.56 So
far, they have only signed it.
Discourse also shows linkages between U.S. national identity and the
Arctic, although less strongly than in the case of Canada. Official
documents highlight elements of an Arctic identity and the ideas of
frontier and pioneer spirit. The United States is “an Arctic Nation,”57
and the Artic is framed as frontier, as “one of our planet’s last great
frontiers” – with the U.S. “pioneering spirit … naturally drawn” to it.58
The United States National Security Strategy defines the country as
“Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic
region” – and emphasis lies on national interests and security.59 With
“the emerging maritime frontier of the Arctic” enlarging the operating
area and the United States being a “maritime nation,” the Arctic as
sphere of influence gains importance.60 References to the frontier and
pioneering spirit strongly resonate with U.S. national identity, and
express the space-identity nexus. In agreement with scholars, it
becomes visible how such representations facilitate the expansion of
reach and influence beyond U.S. borders.61 The Arctic representation as
sphere of influence and the argued need to protect interests fit with
U.S. national identity, illustrating the American exceptionalism and
assertion of global leadership. Discourse expresses strong risk
representations of an urgency regarding the need to protect and defend
interests and security, with a space-identity nexus.
Russia
Risk representations of Russia express a new and recently grown focus
on the Arctic region. Both the updated maritime strategy of 2015 and
the Arctic strategy of 2013 illustrate the increased importance of the
region. In line with Russia gearing up to strengthen its influence in the
Arctic, there was the planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole in
2007 – a symbolic claim to space and territory, or act of spatial
ordering. Behind the expanded focus on the Arctic are economic and
resource interests, and more recently heightened strategic and national
security concerns. Russian discourse sees the Arctic as key resource
base and sphere of influence. In contrast to Canada and the United
States, the Arctic seems to be less important for national identity; there
are no clear references to this.
In 2008, then-president Medvedev adopted the Russian Federation
Policy for the Arctic to 2020.62 The document raised the Arctic’s
significance for Russia’s economic development, safety and security,
and national interests; it proclaimed the Russian goal of being a leading
21
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Arctic power by 2020.63 In 2013 at the Russian Ministry of Defense,
president Putin warned of an existing Arctic militarization, which was
endangering Russian security.64 In 2014, he warned that Russia faces
new risks and challenges from changes in the world and new social and
economic conditions. He stated that Russia would act to protect its
national interests also in the Arctic. He raised the “need to strengthen
our military infrastructure,” to strengthen security at Russia’s Arctic
borders, and to protect economic interests in “this promising region.”
Russia would also protect its territorial rights in the resource-rich
Arctic shelf in order to “safeguard each parcel.”65 Thus, Russian risk
representations see Arctic developments becoming acute, creating
concerns over resources, but also territory and security. The Maritime
Doctrine of 2015 furthermore highlights the links between the Arctic
and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the Arctic’s importance for
Russia’s territorial defense via its Northern Fleet. Russia is increasingly
seeing the Arctic as strategically important. This fits well with the goal
of strengthening the Northern Fleet’s defense capacities, and the
protection of Russia’s Arctic interests, called for in the Military
Doctrine of Russia in 2014.66
When considering the Russian northern coast, the importance of the
Arctic to the country and its role in risk representations become quite
clear. About 7000 km coastline and several rivers going inland connect
the region with the country. Even others recognize the Arctic’s central
economic importance.67 Furthermore, Russia is factually mostly
controlling the NSR, having its icebreaking fleet present for the winter
months. Other states thus fear unforeseeable cost increases, which is
among the reasons why they reject Russian plans for sole NSR
administration. Russia’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020 states the
intention to use the NSR for its international navigation under its own
jurisdiction and for the benefit of national interests.68 Seen from a
spatial perspective, factual NSR control would give Russia a means to
expand its sphere of influence in the Arctic, potentially at the cost of
others. Other coastal states though warn against such steps.69 The
representation of the Arctic as Russia’s resource base also illustrates
attempts at spatial ordering and a sphere-of-influence approach,
motivated by concerns over resources, territory, and security. Russian
risk representations and interests in the Arctic though collide with
those of Canada and the United States. The next section pinpoints
existing conflicts of interests and the actions that coastal states take to
defend their interests and address security concerns.
Conflicts of Interests and Confrontational Actions
Canada
Underlining its view of the Arctic, Canada has implemented numerous
measures to bolster its position in the region, including for increased
effectiveness of control and protection against threats.70 The
implementation of Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy of 2013 included the
introduction and/or strengthening of additional measures.71 Canada
22
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has especially bolstered its surveillance, patrol, and interception
capacities.72 Canada is concerned particularly with its sovereignty and
security. To safeguard Canadian Arctic sovereignty, the Canadian Arctic
seabed was to be comprehensively mapped, aerial surveillance
increased, patrol ships added, Arctic Rangers increased and
strengthened, and the Canadian military forces modernized. Activities
also include the building of a new Arctic research station. Already the
Northern Strategy from 2009 called to meet the growing international
interest in the Arctic with both strengthened Canadian patrol and
presence in Arctic land, sea, and skies, aiming at a stable Arctic that
benefits and secures Canada.73
The Canadian perspective includes another key challenge, namely how
to prevent an Arctic arms race. While the states within the Arctic Circle
continually state their goal of cooperation, their articulated objectives
to protect their interests and supporting actions show otherwise. With
notable increases of some states’ military capacities in the region,
Canada sees reason for alarm regarding its sovereignty and security.
Furthermore, the United States and Russia have not ended their Arctic
nuclear operations, only reduced them, and Russia is modernizing its
Northern Fleet for stated defense purposes. There is thus a “distinct
possibility of accidental launch of nuclear weapons” by both states.74
Arguably, this U.S.-Russian context also has an inherent escalation
dynamic; a deterioration of relations could then trigger escalation. This
reminds of a potential security dilemma, as stated above, and
illustrations how risk representations and actions interact. As more of
the Arctic becomes ice-free, both countries, and others, will likely
expand their presence in the region for their benefit – increasing the
potential for the collision of interests in resources and influence.
Canada shares some points of contention towards Russia with the
United States. Both strongly reject any Russian efforts for the military
protection of its Arctic energy and security interests, as well as Russia’s
troop increases in the Arctic.75 Neither country has come forward on
how to deal with this conflict of interests and the supporting actions up
until now, pointing to considerable conflict potential. Canada (and the
United States) has also strongly criticized Russia’s 2007 flag planting
on the North Pole and responded with an increase of military and
surveillance capacities.
United States
Recognizing the grown importance of the Arctic to the U.S., activities
show an increased focus on the region. Key are the protection of U.S.
national interests in the Arctic, the view of the region as sphere of
influence, the need to protect national security also via the Arctic, and
the gains from new opportunities in the region. While the United States
would cooperate with other actors when useful, cooperation must
promote national interests. Since Obama’s presidency, the United
States has increased its Arctic commitment, revised Arctic
strategiesstrategies, and formulated a more active Arctic policy.
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Obama’s 2015 visit to the region, as the first sitting U.S. president,
raised the region’s profile. The “staging” of the region included the
promotion of U.S. regional leadership and national security.76 The
country has also used the AC chair role (2015-2017) to influence Arctic
developments for own benefit.77 Experts furthermore point to other
countries gearing up to profit from new opportunities in the Arctic. 78
U.S. actions point to an increased Arctic link to national defense and
security issues.
The United States has therefore strengthened Arctic domain awareness
and plans to further do so, including with exercises for maritime
readiness and ice-impacted water operations.79 The country will protect
interests and counter any challenges to U.S. global mobility and
security, including “excessive maritime claims” of other states.80
According to former U.S. Defense Secretary Hagel, the country will
respond to the “flood of interests in energy exploration” and its effects
on other Arctic issues.81 Fitting U.S. responses are stability measures
and security cooperation, but also preemptive means and increased
military operations.82 These measures highlight the concerns over how
changes, and other states’ reactions to a changing Arctic, may affect
U.S. security, and economic and geopolitical interests. Others will likely
interpret preemptive and military measures as confrontational action,
to which they may respond in kind, again alluding to a potential
security dilemma developing.
Specific challengers to U.S. interests and security are Russia and China
as the “two near-peer strategic competitors.”83 In the current global
context, the United States has focused on Russia and China as the
states most threatening national interests.84 While the United States
has also cooperated with Russia in the region, there are increasing
points of contention as well as risks from recent Russian actions,
including larger naval exercises and new military equipment. There are
also stronger responses to the perceived Russian systematic
intimidation of forces from NATO and Western European states in the
Arctic and nearby. Since the Ukraine crisis, the United States has
notably increased the monitoring of the growing Russian threat
potential.85 In addition, at a recent AC meeting, U.S. Secretary of State
Pompeo lashed out at both Russia and China for their more and more
aggressive behavior.86 Vis-à-vis China, there is an increase in activities
too. Seeing China as threat to the U.S. ability for norm setting, the
United States now monitors Chinese behavior more closely.87 Overall,
U.S. actions, in part certainly confrontational, echo U.S. risk
representations.
Russia
According to the Policy for the Arctic to 2020, Russia will assure
sufficient fighting potential to keep its zone of the Arctic a secure space
for own benefits.88 Russia has modernized its military capacities in
recent years, fortified its Northern fleet, and conducts regular military
exercises. Frequency and size of exercises have grown. Its nuclear
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submarines and intercontinental rockets present significant offensive
power also to defend its Arctic interests.89 Some argue that much of the
growing military capacities in the Arctic is not necessarily directed at
the Arctic.90 Yet, the country is developing anti-access/area denial
capacities for maritime spaces, including the North Atlantic. Russia has
notably expanded maritime activities. It has added 6000 soldiers and
radar and sensing networks in the Murmansk region, reopened ten new
bases in 2015, plans additional bases in the Arctic, and is buying icebreaking vessels. Putin ordered the Russian government and its
agencies to work to implement Russian Arctic objectives with sufficient
financial resources.91 Russia has thus come forward with substantial
backing to safeguard its interests of a secure Arctic. Other states, such
as Canada and the United States, though consider Russian militaryand security-related actions confrontational, as addressed above.
The other key aim of Russia is economic development, using the Arctic
as strategic resource base. In light of an intensifying global resource
and markets competition, Russia is acting to develop Arctic resources,
according to the Russian National Security Strategy from 2015. Russia
plans to turn the region into its key resource base, as stated in The
Policy for the Arctic to 2020. To foster a climate friendly to its interests,
Russia also sees frontier and international cooperation a fitting
measure.92 Russia is leading in Arctic offshore oil production. It has
significantly increased energy-related investments directed at Arctic
mapping, and exploration that focus on oil, gas and mining.93 Russia is
highly dependent on foreign technology, and recent sanctions have led
to difficulties in pursuing its off- and onshore development of Arctic
resources.94 Yet, Russia has, with South Korean help, succeeded in
getting the world’s first liquid natural gas (LNG) tanker that can
operate in the Arctic all of the year; LNG is projected to gain much
significance in the future. Russia’s economy depends on hydrocarbon
exports, making the Arctic reserves essential. Russian oil and gas
companies are also greatly increasing their spending and exploration.95
The growing Russian power projection on land and sea, and close
military encounters with Russian forces increase the potential of
Russian-Western confrontation in the Arctic.96 Both ecnomic and
security drivers motivate the actions directed at harvesting resources
and protecting territory. With risk representations and actions colliding
with those of other coastal states, actions point to a greater contestation
and possibly conflict.
The China Factor – A Destabilizer?
Recently, at an AC meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo strongly
refuted China’s Arctic claims as well as China’s self-claimed near-Arctic
status, and strongly criticized its behavior in the Arctic.97 China is only
an AC observer and has no sovereign rights in the Arctic, which is why
the article here discusses China separate from coastal states. The
country is, however, a globally rising actor that since a few years claims
Arctic interests. While China is at a great distance from the Arctic,
decision makers in Beijing are articulating ever more strongly Arctic
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interests, and Chinese companies are greatly expanding their Arctic
activities. The self-definition of near-Arctic state underlines this. China
can affect the Arctic either directly with own actions or indirectly via
other states acting in response to Chinese activities in/towards the
region. Already more than ten years ago, when the coastal states restated their territorial sovereignty over the Arctic in the 2008 Ilulissat
Declaration, Beijing rejected any exclusion of non- or near-Arctic
governments.98 This may illustrate Chinese risk representations of
being ‘left outside’ when it comes to hoped-for new resources and
influence. To support its Arctic ambitions, Beijing has made it a
national goal since at least 2013 of becoming a maritime power. China
aims to utilize the oceans for global power status and development. 99
This view highlights a construction of the Arctic as space in which
China can implement its goals and interests. Both Chinese discourse
and actions carry potential for conflict.
In the first policy paper on the Arctic, Beijing outlines its key interests:
resources, new and/or shorter transit routes, and security.100 Resources
are to satisfy current needs and guarantee future resource security and
economic growth. Details of implementation remain uncertain though.
Some thus describe China’s Arctic interests as “undeclared foreign
policy” that is only articulated slowly to the outside world.101 To
strengthen its position, Beijing frames the Arctic as constituting a
global common, even though the greatest part lies within EEZs. Some
even see Beijing aiming for a reordering of the Arctic legal regime by
claiming that resources are global commons, to which China can then
make its assertions.102 China may also have chosen to circumvent the
legal constraints by building up influence in the region. In fact, China is
positioning itself as key partner for multiple states within the Arctic
region and nearby, and as Arctic stakeholder. As scholars point out,
Chinese firms make large-scale investment in key development projects
in the Arctic; construct and renovate ports, airports, and other
infrastructure; and make large-scale land purchases. They build
strategic bi- and multilateral relationships; implement cross-regional
projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that includes an ‘Arctic
Silk Road’; and advance in related research and technology, including
the construction of icebreakers.103 The government partly supports and
promotes these activities.
China’s Arctic and Antarctic Administration states that China cannot
let others split the resources but must expand own influence in the
Arctic. This highlights Chinese risk representations, and the linked
construction of the Arctic full of resources. Chinese firms are building
up technology and skills for competitive Arctic operation, including
cargo ships with ice class, and they are among the largest buyers of
international oil assets, some directed towards the Arctic.104 According
to a report on Chinese activities of the last years, the greatest part of the
over 1.4 trillion US$ investment in Arctic states plus Finland and
Sweden goes into energy and mineral resources.105 Cooperation
projects exist with Canada, the United States, and Russia, and
increasingly so with smaller states like Greenland and Iceland, but also
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Finland and Norway. Some argue that other regions can better satisfy
Chinese resource interests.106 Yet, China acts to profit from Arctic
resources, expanding investment and partnerships for a stronger
foothold in the Arctic and its development. Furthermore, there is
potential for long-term military conflict.107 China is building a position
to restrain the coastal states’ room of action, to which they will likely
react. China’s military modernization, non-transparent military
intentions, aggressive ways of resolving territorial disputes, and the
development of anti-access/area-denial, cyber, and space control tools
directed against the West can foster destabilization and security
risks.108 China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea is a
warning of how China implements its interests.
China is also increasing its cooperation with Russia, including on Arctic
matters. That China is thereby gaining additional advantage vis-á-vis
the Arctic should be of concern. Intensifying Chinese-Russian strategic
aligning is another issue that particularly worries Canadian and U.S.
decision makers, along with the growing possibility of China and Russia
together effectively challenging the U.S.-Western global order.109 China
and Russia have intensified their relations in many areas, and to depths
not expected by observers.110 Aside from growing economic and
resource cooperation, both countries cooperate on advanced military
technology, including a nuclear-operated aircraft carrier. For now, both
sides benefit. Russia needs China also for financing, especially since
Western sanctions have cut revenues. China stepped in to save Russia’s
Yamal LNG project, but thereby strengthened its own position. Soon,
China may outcompete Russia and constrain Russia’s Arctic influence,
which could destabilize regional relations. While China has been
careful to act cooperatively and avoid open tension over Arctic matters,
closer cooperation with Russia enables China to exert influence in the
Arctic. Some argue that Chinese behavior may depend on how soon
there will be ice-free passages, and on the country’s evolving
international role.111 The United States, and others, should work to
soften the negative effects on U.S. and western interests.112 China will
likely use its growing influence wherever possible, over time also with
increased confrontation. Already now, risk representations express
Chinese fears of its interests threatened by others. Coastal states are
already including China in their risk representations. All sides are
responding with more or less confrontational actions, pointing to how
risk representations and actions inform each other. It thus becomes
essential to find appropriate ways to deal with China in the Arctic, also
to reduce risks to Arctic stability.

Conclusion: Rising Conflict Potential in the Arctic
Risk representations and confrontational actions by Canada, the United
States, and Russia point to a rising conflict potential in the region. With
non-Artic China expanding its foothold in the region, future Arctic
stability becomes even more uncertain. Risk representations and
confrontational actions inform each other. On all sides, there are then
approaches towards the Arctic as sphere of influence that primarily
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serve national interests. Risk representations include constructions of
space and identity vis-à-vis the Arctic. Thus, Canada and the United
States see themselves as northern nations that conquer and protect
their frontier with their pioneering spirit. In the case of Russia, the
identity aspect is not clearly present. All three though show a strong
spatial construction of the Arctic for economic exploitation, geopolitical
influence, and/or security. Whereas non-Arctic China also shows no
clear identity aspect, it shares the construction of the Arctic as space for
opportunity and gain, in the Chinese case for resource exploitation,
shipping, and geopolitical influence. Risk representations on all sides
show concerns and fears for national interests and/or sovereignty and
security. They also express an increasingly determined or even
aggressive rhetoric regarding the protection of national Arctic interests.
Risk representations materialize in confrontational actions, creating a
growing potential for actual conflict. Thus, relations between Canada
and the United States on the one side and Russia and China on the
other side are becoming more fragile. Tension over developments
outside the Arctic can exacerbate fragile relations. Hopes and claims
over new resources and shipping routes but also security concerns
bring further uncertainty, and the increasingly influential China,
building its foothold in the Arctic, can unsettle stability, too. In such a
context, actions may escalate. Growing conflict potential should not be
underestimated, especially since existing means of governance and
cooperation are not sufficiently prepared to manage conflict.
Which measures can suitably address rising conflict potential from risk
representations and confrontational actions? There is a need to make
risk representations and how they interact with actions more
transparent. Coastal states and the Arctic Eight need to articulate and
share what they perceive as threatening to their interests, and why. It is
important to express and explain the underlying motivations and fears,
including the spatial and identity aspects. With an understanding of
what motivates each other’s actions, actors can reflect on how they may
contribute to tension. While conflicts of interest are common in
interstate relations, it is important to understand how risk
representations can harden positions and intensify conflicts of interest.
Risk representations can facilitate escalation – the more when there is
not sufficient awareness of them. Aside from making risk
representations, transparent, future Arctic stability needs tools to
address confrontational actions. They should include early warning
indicators and the fast evaluation of security-related developments.
Also developments below the level of conflict need to be addressed,
such as the pausing or stop of agreed cooperation measures, increases
in surveillance, and instances of threat-making. As the Arctic moves
closer to the opening of new resources and transport routes,
functioning means for conflict prevention and management should be
in place.
As risk representations and confrontational actions in the Arctic also
include non-Arctic China, ways to deal with Chinese interests and
actions are needed to manage conflict potential. A sustainable
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regulation of security issues will require the maintenance of the respect
for sovereign rights of coastal states. At the same time, coastal states
cannot ignore the growing Chinese foothold in the Arctic. Arctic states
must then develop workable ways of including China at some level of
responsibility and gain. Maintaining sovereign rights of coastal states
and still integrating China in some manner presents a considerable
challenge yet unanswered. A sensible way of doing so will require legal
expertise and mechanisms, which other articles must discuss.
Furthermore, the case of China touches on questions of how to deal
with the global common, with climate change having extra-regional
impact, and the interests of other non-Arctic states. These larger
questions are of a global nature, and they will move more into the
foreground in the coming years. While there are no clear and agreed
answers yet, any decisions and measures attending to this should tie
the sharing of gains to a sharing of responsibility.
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